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Doing Water Quality
Credit Trading Right
Alexandra Dapolito Dunn and Elise Bacon
T he u.s. Environmental Protection Agency's. (EPA's) Water Quality Trading Policy (Policy),68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (2003), encourages states toadopt voluntary water quality credit trading
programs and highlights how trading programs can facil-
itate the implementation of Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs), reduce Clean Water Act compliance costs,
promote voluntary pollutant reductions, and further
other important watershed-based initiatives. In the two
years that have passed since EPA released its Policy,
many public clean water agencies have explored and
then embarked on trading programs in an effort to
resolve complex water quality challenges consistent with
the Policy. Taking place in many different parts of the
country, these projects have sought not only to build on
lessons learned from the vast number of early trading
projects, but also to explore new territory as encouraged
by the Policy. Without question, today there truly is
renewed energy and interest around water quality credit
trading on the part of utility managers, watershed stake-
holders, and the general public.
One might think that with this regulatory and policy
climate, the time is ideal to consider developing a water
quality credit trading program, and that the pathway to
implementation might be quite smooth. In reality,
however, many of the same core challenges that con-
fronted almost every early trading program still remain.
These problems largely come from several inherent
inequities that are present in any watershed-based trad-
ing environment, and which cannot be completely
eliminated because they derive from existing federal
regulatory provisions. These inequities include differ-
ing regulatory authority over the parties in a trading
program, the parties' varying need to make a trade in
order to meet enforceable permit limits, and the related
willingness of and pressures on different parties to come
to the table and participate in a water quality credit
trading program.
For example, as regulated point sources, municipali-
ties must assure compliance with the effluent limitations
in their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
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System (NPDES) permits. As public entities responsible
for providing an essential public health service, munici-
palities as a practical matter almost necessarily must
come to the trading table for both regulatory and publiC
outreach reasons. For NPDES permittees not interested
in trading, regulatory authorities always retain the abili-
ty to simply exercise their enforcement powers to
address a pollutant of concern. In contrast, trading is
more discretionary for other participants in a trading
program, such as unpermitted nonpoint sources.
Recent experience reveals that when these inequities
are openly acknowledged at the start of a trading pro-
gram and are not used by one party to disadvantage
another, the water quality credit trading program has the
potential to be quite successful. However, if any party
to a trading program seeks to capitalize on the inherent
inequities-either by asking too much from another
party or by trying to force a particular result-the trad-
ing program is likely to crumble under its own weight.
To make trading work in the real world, the four key
principles addressed in this article should be considered
in the up-front design and subsequent implementation
of a program. First, it should be understood that the
participants in a trading program may freely use the
credits or offsets generated under the trading program as
a part of their regular compliance efforts. The opposite
view suggests that the use of legitimately created credits
by a program participant is evidence of ultimate non-
compliance. Under this approach, the trader is viewed
and ultimately treated as a violator rather than as an
innovator, and the credit is characterized as mitigation
for the violation. Programs adopting this "violator
view" encounter difficulties by suggesting that sources
should reduce effluent concentrations so greatly that the
ultimate use of a credit is unnecessary, rendering trading
moot. Moreover, treating credit trading as mitigation
creates significant regulatory and public relations disin-
centives for participation in what is intended to be a
voluntary effort.
Second, cost savings are a benefit. A source should
not be viewed skeptically merely because it achieves
cost savings through trading. In fact, EPA's Policy
rejects the notion that sources ultimately saving money
through trading cannot truly be benefiting the environ-
ment. Trading programs built upon the "skeptical view"
ultimately will founder if stakeholders are so overly con-
43
HeinOnline -- 20 Nat. Resources & Env’t 44 2005-2006
its own weight.
likely to crumble under
the trading program is
on the inherent inequities.
holder satisfaction and sufficient support to take a trad-
ing program from design to successful implementation.
Many of the benchmark programs in this regard were
among the first formal functioning trading programs.
They developed in the mid- to late-1990s, benefited
from at least a five-year gestation period, and were
launched by the early 2000s. Several newer programs
also are characterized by equity and fairness between
stakeholders.
The benchmark group includes established programs
for these watershed areas: Lower Boise River, Idaho
(point-point or point-nonpoint phosphorus credit
trading); Cherry Creek, Colorado (predominantly
point-nonpoint phosphorus credit trading); Long Island
Sound, Connecticut (point-point nitrogen credit trad-
ing); San Joaquin Valley Grasslands,
California (selenium credit trading
among irrigation districts); and Tar
Pamlico River, North Carolina
(point-point or point-nonpoint
nitrogen credit trading). Among
the more recent programs, three
stand out. One is the watershed
permit and nitrogen trading program
for certain Neuse River, North
Carolina dischargers. Another is
the watershed permit that supports
point-point dissolved oxygen credit
trading and point-nonpoint temper-
ature credit trading by a single utili-
ty, Clean Water Services, with four
wastewater treatment plants on the
Tualatin River in Oregon. The
third is the Virginia Nutrient Credit
Exchange Program that will cover
all municipal and industrial point
sources in five major river basins that are tributaries to
the Chesapeake Bay under a general permit and enable
point-point trading among them, as well as point-non-
point trading in specified limited circumstances.
Certainly, other programs could be included in either
group, but collectively these demonstrate how to do
water quality trading right.
So how exactly-by circumstance or choice-do
these programs illustrate the four principles intro-
duced at the outset of this article? First and foremost,
they clearly treat compliance achieved through trad-
ing as "equal" to compliance achieved without trad-
ing. Within these regulatory, policy, and philosophi-
cal frameworks, trading is legally, practically, and
morally equivalent to not trading-not worse and not
better, so long as effluent limits or loading caps are
met, subject of course to specific rules governing eligi-
bility, trading transactions and tracking and reporting
of such transactions.
Supporters and participants in the benchmark pro-
grams were able to arrive at an approach that treats
Ifany party to a trading
program seeks to capitalize
cerned about the savings sought by permitted sources
through trading that the economic incentives for partic-
ipation are kept below what they should be to draw
participation.
Third, a trading program needs to be truly voluntary.
Under semivoluntary or nonvoluntary approaches, regu-
lators implicitly ask-or explicitly attempt-to force
point sources to take on patently inequitable additional
pollutant-reduction obligations in "exchange" for the
p;ivilege of trading. Many programs struggle to achieve
the proper balance between a voluntary trading program
that leads to pollutant reductions, and a less than vol-
untary program that is based on the regulator's ultimate
ability to force a reduction by reducing a point source's
permit limitation for a particular pollutant. This bal-
ance is difficult to achieve due to
the significant differences in the
Clean Water Act's approach to con-
trolling point and nonpoint sources
of pollution. Point sources in a
trading program always are responsi-
ble at the end of the day for permit
compliance, and the specter of
enforcement looms in the back-
ground. On the other hand, because
nonpoint sources do not require a
permit, they can implement their
reductions in a more flexible and
Trading Done Right
A quick review of the trading programs that are being
actively implemented across the United States today
reveals that most are good, if not excellent, examples of
how principles of equity and fairness can yield stake-
iterative manner.
Fourth, and finally, the level of
pollutant reduction needed to gener-
ate credits must be set fairly and
with certainty. Ambiguous baselines
for defining creditable reductions
can undermine a trading program in
two ways. Moving credit "targets"
can lead to a perception that there will be no measura-
ble pollutant reductions with trading, delaying TMDL
compliance or making the ultimate attainment of water
quality goals mathematically impossible. Shifting base-
lines also can leave credits vulnerable to diminution or
invalidation, thereby presenting an unacceptable level
of risk to prospective credit buyers and sellers.
The next section of this article explores how these
four principles have been successfully followed in trad-
ing programs to date. This article then analyzes a cur-
rent trading initiative that lies in limbo because these
principles are being ignored. Finally, we summarize key
observations and speculate generally on the future via-
bility of water quality trading.
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that can do more than
those credits to sources with
required, when they can sell
higher relative control costs.
Second, within this framework of equivalency
between trading or not trading, a primary driver for
establishing a trading option in the first place almost
always is to lower the cost of achieving an individual or
collective water quality-related target, such as water
quality-based effluent limits, wasteload and load alloca-
tions of TMDLs or other types of pollutant load caps or
reduction goals. Stakeholders know or believe that
more cost-effective ways to control pollutant loads exist
than would be required or captured by a traditional reg-
ulatory approach. In a classic market sense, trading
options harness differences in relative control costs
among sources. Well-designed programs create econom-
ic incentives for sources that can do more than required,
when they can sell those credits to sources with higher
relative control costs. Credit buyers
have incentive to participate in
trading when they can save money
over what they would have spent to
U7ell-designed programs create achieve compliance without trading.
In a practical sense, many of the
.. . fi benchmark program credit markets
economzc Incentzves or sources
are "managed," in that prices (and
by implication profits) are set or
controlled. Most are closed mar-
kets, in that only certain types of or
named point sources are allowed to
buy or sell credits, and eligible non-
point source credits are preapproved
by category, location or transaction
mechanism. Despite the lack of a
"pure" free market among the
benchmark programs, they all are
unapologetically encouraging, seek-
ing-and finding-equal or better
environmental results for less money
through trading.
Importantly, no benchmark program exists where reg-
ulators or other stakeholders purposefully attempted to
constrain the level of cost-savings that a point source
buying or otherwise securing credits could realize.
Certainly, some trading rules have the effect of reducing
cost-savings compared to what point sources would see
under different rules. But these outcomes generally
have been reached as a matter of course through a bot-
tom-up approach to program design as it pertains to
cost-effectiveness and potential cost-savings. For exam-
ple, trading ratios have a direct impact on the cost of a
credit to a buyer that can be significant: double the
trading ratio, double the cost of a credit. Thus, at a
ratio of 1.5:1, a point source would need one and a half
credits, that might cost $10 each, to offset one pound at
its plant, for a total cost of $15, whereas at a ratio of
3:1, the point source would need three credits, for a
total cost of $30. As mentioned above, most of the
benchmark programs have followed a science-based
approach to setting trading ratios, to the extent avail-
trading as equal to not trading in part by agreeing on
the spatial and temporal relationship between pollutant
loadings and reductions at one source location relative
to another. Trading ratios are the most common way
watershed stakeholders have accounted for differences,
known and unknown, between the impact of a pollutant
contributed by Source A at Point A and Time A, and
the benefit of a pollutant reduction by Source N at
Point N and Time N. A wide variety in analytical
approach and rigor is represented among the trading
ratio methodologies of the benchmark programs.
Several programs made extensive use of water quality
models and demonstration project monitoring. Others
elected to use or had to make do with best professional
judgment using what local data was available. Still oth-
ers simply adopted ratios that had
been accepted elsewhere and were
acceptable to the relevant authori-
ties and decision-makers.
Seasonally variable ratios and sea-
sonally bounded trading periods are
two other ways used successfully to
establish "equivalency" between a
pound of pollutant traded and a
pound not traded.
A critical confirmation of the
fundamental view that the trading
option, once granted and if properly
exercised, is an equal and not lesser
outcome than pollutant reductions
achieved by other means, is the
complete lack of mitigation require-
ments or penalties levied on
NPDES dischargers electing to use
credits as permitted. In fact, most
of the permits have carefully con-
structed limits, where the permittee
is determined to meet its limits if: (1) its effluent con-
centrations or pollutant loadings are below allowed lim-
its or (2) it holds, or otherwise obtains within sufficient
time, enough valid credits to offset exceedences above
the applicable limit. Of course, they must also meet
other applicable requirements for compliance in the
broadest sense. These requirements appear either with
the dual effluent limits or elsewhere in the permit as a
blanket condition governing all aspects of permit com-
pliance. Together, these permit provisions maintain
regulatory authority and ensure that compliance is
judged not just by having enough credits but also by
following all the rules that may be associated with
securing and applying them. The net effect is that so
long as (l) or (2) above, and the applicable require-
ments, are met there is never a moment-not even a
second-where a permittee using credits as offsets is not
in compliance with the Clean Water Act. Therefore,
such permittees have created no harm requiring a
penalty, mitigation, or remedy.
NR&E Summer 2005
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and supporters.
source actions are creditable to
Stakeholders developing
and clearly what nonpoint
options must define carefully
the satisfaction ofparticipants
cations (LAs) among point sources, and between the
collective WLAs ~nd LAs, there were no claims that a
WLA or group of WLAs was set lower because of or to
facilitate or force trading.
Within the point-nonpoint source trading arena,
another problematic approach is setting trading ratios
to achieve a specific outcome. This is done by first
determining a target nonpoint source load reduction
then identifying the trading ratio for a specific point
source or group of dischargers that offers the best
chance of hitting that target, based on analysis of rela-
tive control costs and potential demand for credits.
This problem is similar to setting trading ratios artifi-
cially high in an attempt to limit
cost-savings to credit buyers. Again,
among the benchmark programs,
trading ratios appear to have avoided
these pitfalls by using a bottom-up
approach working from baseline
point-nonpoint source trading individual or collective environmen-
tal performance targets-ultimately
yielding successful programs.
The fourth principle essential to a
successful program is equity and fair-
ness in determining what actions can
generate sellable or otherwise usable
credits, and whether any credits are
either ineligible or limited in amount
or durability in some respect. By def-
inition, every trading program needs
to establish trading baselines. When
loadings are below the baseline, the
difference (surplus reductions) may
be fully or partially creditable.
When loadings are above the base-
line, credits will be needed to offset the exceedence or
overage. If TMDLs are in place, the default baselines
are the WLAs and LAs. If TMDLs are not in place,
existing individual technology-based or water quality-
based effluent limits define the baselines for point
sources, while existing programmatic or legal require-
ments (state and/or local) define the baselines for non-
point sources.
As a practical matter, baselines for point sources are
unambiguous, firm, and not optional by virtue of
NPDES effluent limitations if no TMDL has been con-
ducted or, if a TMDL is in place, via WLA assignment
and implementation through permits. Baselines for
nonpoint sources can be just the opposite, depending on
the approach to land use management taken in a specif-
ic watershed. This means that stakeholders developing
point-nonpoint source trading options must define care-
fully and clearly what nonpoint source actions are cred-
itable to the sufficient satisfaction of participants and
supporters. At a minimum, this establishes a level play-
ing field within the nonpoint source sector-minimizing
rewards for laggards. But more importantly, it elimi-
able tools and data allowed. It has not been suggested
in any of these programs that the ratios were set arbi-
trarily high to limit cost-savings.
Third, point-nonpoint trading programs in particular
must solve problems associated with a fundamentally
unlevel playing field with respect to the disparate
authority that the Clean Water Act and the NPDES
program impose on point sources versus nonpoint
sources when it comes to requirements for controlling
pollutant loadings. By contrast, point-point trading pro-
grams pose fewer problems with respect to a level play-
ing field. Concerns about equity and fairness in pro-
grams involving only point sources usually have to do
with baseline responsibilities before
additional treatment generates
credits in cases where significantly
different levels of treatment may be
in use among the dischargers.
Clearly, the federal government
and states have powerful tools at
their disposal to establish and
change (usually tighten) waste-
water treatment requirements with
technology- or water quality-based
effluent limits. In cases where
TMDLs are in place, NPDES per-
mits provide a strong regulatory
mechanism to force compliance
with wasteload allocations
(WLAs). In contrast, limiting pol-
lutant loadings from nonpoint
sources is largely accomplished, if
at all, through federal and state
cost-share programs that help to
pay for best management practice
implementation. In fact, most state regulations applica-
ble to nonpoint sources are for the development of
nutrient management plans, or take the form of local
ordinances of varying strength and scope that govern
land use activities. Rarely are additional mechanisms
created to implement the load allocations (LAs)
assigned to nonpoint sources.
The disparity in regulatory leverage over point and
nonpoint sources can tempt regulators and other stake-
holders in a trading process to disproportionately lower
point source wasteload allocations (WLAs) relative to
their individual or collective contributions to the partic-
ular water quality problem. The objective is that pollu-
tant reductions will be "successfully achieved" more
quickly than through a more equitable allocation of
responsibilities among point and nonpoint sources. It
seems that this temptation was not acted upon in the
benchmark situations, as many of the TMDLs were
established prior to or independently of the trading
option. While in these situations some point sources
have scientific or procedural disagreements with their
WLAs and/or with the overall assignment of load allo-
NR&E Summer 2005
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one source versus another.
Some have suggested that
not trading, instead ofthe
ofpollutant load reduction at
trading ratios be based on the
relative cost of trading versus
Case," as it is in a state of limbo between continuing or
dissolving.
First, in the Limbo Case, the regulatory authorities
have asserted that a permittee needing to use a credit
ultimately would be mitigating environmental harm via
the credit. This approach is making the trading pro-
gram design discussions more like a natural resources
damage assessment (NRDA) discussion, in which the
actions of parties who have injured the environment are
subject to fines and penalties. NRDAs typically are cal-
culated using economic methods that estimate the mon-
etary value of the harm (e.g., in terms of clean up costs
or stakeholder willingness to pay for certain benefits)
and consider the savings or profits
the polluter reaped by engaging in
the violation. Depending on the
circumstances, the required pay-
ments may include a penalty com-
ponent over and above the amount
necessary to return the harmed area
to its original condition, or provide
an equivalent environmental bene-
fit somewhere else if it is impossible
to completely mitigate the impacted
site. This is an incorrect framework
to apply to a trading program on a
relative environmental benefit legal, regulatory or policy basis
because according to our first prin-
ciple, no environmental harm has
occurred.
Second, in the Limbo Case, some
have suggested that trading ratios be
based on the relative cost of trading
versus not trading, instead of the
relative environmental benefit of
pollutant load reduction at one source versus another.
This approach arbitrarily (or not so arbitrarily) limits
cost savings and is inconsistent with both EPA's Policy
and the fundamental economic forces that make trading
work. The trading ratio is proposed to be derived from
the permittee's economic and financial data, setting the
trading ratio such that a credit would cost the permittee
a desired fraction of the in-plant unit control cost.
Those advancing this approach have not yet stated their
target limit on cost-savings the permittee would achieve
through trading, except to say that the proposed credit
package will be evaluated on the basis of its cost com-
pared to in-plant treatment.
In the Limbo Case, the regulatory authorities appear
to have a substantial concern with the permittee
achieving an equal or better environmental result for
less money. Notably, the assumption also seems to be
that an in-plant option, the cost of which would be used
to limit cost-savings with trading, is both technically
and financially feasible. Neither has been proven yet.
The permittee has pointed out that even if an in-plant
option would provide the additional control level neces-
nates the risk to point sources using credits to comply
with their loading limits that a program participant or
third party will come along after the fact and claim the
credits are invalid because the actions that generated
them were supposed to be counted toward some other
legal or voluntary obligation. The benchmark programs
have successfully defined nonpoint source baselines with
sufficient equity and fairness to gain support for program
implementation and participation.
For the most part, the benchmark programs imple-
mented to date demonstrate a variety of approaches to
assembling the key trading design elements into pro-
grams that generally are considered equitable and fair by
all involved. This success must be
attributed in part to the technical
acumen, problem-solving abilities,
and commitment to multiyear pro-
gram design phases by key stakehold-
ers. An equally or probably more
important hallmark of these pro-
grams is the collaboration that
exists, at a minimum between the
point sources and the regulators, and
in many cases among a wider group
of stakeholders including non-
governmental organizations
(NGOs). It is true that in some
cases the trading program was pro-
posed by point sources as an alterna-
tive to a newly proposed water quali-
ty target or TMDL implementation
approach, but these rebuttals became
the basis for cooperatively finding a
more cost-effective approach and
minimizing the inherently adversari-
al relationship between the regulated and the regulators.
Trading Going Wrong? A Case StUdy
Somewhere between one and two dozen trading ini-
tiatives are at various stages of development around the
country in addition to the designed programs that have
passed into the implementation phase. For many of
these, it is too early to tell where the participants will
end up relative to the four principles of a good trading
program. One particular situation involving point-non-
point source trading, however, reveals how prospects for
success can be compromised when the four principles
are disregarded. In this case, the NPDES permittee has
proposed a water quality credit trading program well
aligned with the principles of equity and fairness. In
contrast, some stakeholders, disregarding these key prin-
ciples, are proffering a very different framework for trad-
ing than exemplified in the benchmark programs. The
situation described is not doomed yet, so will remain
nameless in order not to prejudge its chances for a turn-
around. In this article we refer to it as the "Limbo
NR&E Summer 2005
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in tandem with
other efforts to
into compliance.
bring a watershed
Future Directions
Where the four principles are fol-
lowed-eredit use without penalty,
cost-savings without scorn, main-
taining a truly voluntary trading pro-
gram, and establishing certainty
around credit generation-trading
can be a successful complement to
achieving water quality goals in a
watershed. These principles were
followed in the benchmark cases and all stakeholders-
regulated, regulator, NGO, and others-largely benefited
from enhanced water quality progress. However, when
these principles are not followed, the result becomes less
and less enticing to the potential participants. Trading
must work in tandem with other efforts to bring a water-
shed into compliance. It cannot be singled out as a sav-
ing grace, a quick ticket, or an expedient approach. A
successful trading program depends on thoughtful and
equitable approaches. A trading program should not
squeeze certain sources to put them in the position of
taking responsibility for substantially more than their fair
share of a pollutant load. If this occurs, the net result
will be a trading program ultimately set on a course for
economic and environmental failure. Given that it is
most stakeholders' hope that trading becomes a viable
part of the toolkit in watersheds nationwide, careful and
open consideration of the principles outlined in this arti-
cle will ensure that future programs ultimately are added
to the list of successful trading programs. ~
Several solutions have been proposed to this policy and
mathematical conundrum. The LAs could be revised to
leave more room for creditable reductions. Specific projects
or portions of LAs could be made creditable in the TMDL
implementation plan, but it is not clear how the TMDL
and the implementation plan would then match up. Some
have suggested crafting language for an "early actors" provi-
sion that would allow permittees to generate credits by
reducing loads already assigned to other parties under the
LAs, but only if the point sources acted within a specified
period of time. This approach would not completely absolve
those nonpoint sources of their LA responsibilities, but
would create strong incentives to implement reductions as
creditable, which most agree will not soon (or will not
ever) happen otherwise. Finally, several time-consuming
and legally cumbersome avenues appear to be open to the
state to formally declare some sites with LAs "orphans,"
which presumably would free up those
allocations as creditable. As of this
writing, it remains unclear if this issue
will be resolved. Open questions
regarding the creditability of reduc-
tions will discourage most NPDES per-
mittees from entering the trading pro-
gram in any meaningful way.
Trading must work
sary to achieve the loading cap without trading, the cost
is so disproportionately high compared to the incremen-
tal reduction gained and to the relative contribution of
the permittee's load to the total pollutant load in the
waterbody system as to render this option infeasible
from an affordability standpoint. As such, it should not
be viewed as the default nontrading option, much less
used as the basis for setting trading ratios.
Third, other reasons that might lead to a decision to
base trading ratios on cost factors, and not on water
quality benefit equivalencies, would be a goal of achiev-
ing a target level of credit revenue or a goal of achieving
a target level of creditable pollutant load reductions.
Both reasons evidence a top-down approach that gener-
ally does not respect an equitable allocation of responsi-
bilities between point and nonpoint sources. A revenue
stream from a point source's credit purchases can be an
attractive source of funding in the
face of a large number of unpermit-
ted nonpoint sources in the water-
shed. As stated earlier, trading
ratios can be set inappropriately in a
manner that favors nonpoint source
load reduction objectives. In the
Limbo Case, the regulators are ask-
ing what the trading ratio needs to
be to get the target level of funds or
mass reductions. That is the wrong
question according to the principles
of a good trading program. The cor-
rect question is what the trading
ratio needs to be to establish envi-
ronmental equivalency between a
pound reduced/loaded at Source A
versus Sources B, C, and others.
Taken to extremes, this wrong
approach will lead to a situation
where one or more permittees are made responsible for
reductions equal to or even greater than 100 percent of
the total load.
The Limbo Case also fails on the fourth principle of
clarity and certainty of creditability. In this situation, a
draft TMDL has been developed for some of the water-
sheds where prospective nonpoint source credit projects
are being considered. The draft TMDLs assign LAs to
selected nonpoint sources that will require significant
reductions over current loads to achieve water quality
standards. EPA's Policy states that when TMDLs are in
place, LAs establish the nonpoint sources' baseline for
trading, which by definition only makes reductions
beyond that baseline-in the Limbo Case the remaining
and relatively insignificant percentage-ereditable. For
each of the nonpoint source projects under considera-
tion, limiting creditable reductions to a small percent-
age of the total will not provide a sufficient number of
credits for the NPDES permittee's estimated future
needs.
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